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INTRODUCTION TO REVIVING THE AMERICAN JURY 
NANCY S. MARDER1
INTRODUCTION
Anna Offit, a law professor and legal anthropologist, has organized this 
symposium on Reviving the American Jury, by bringing together scholars 
and practitioners from law and other disciplines to study the jury from dif-
ferent vantage points.  The contributors, drawing from their different fields, 
examine a range of questions that pertain to the jury.  Among the questions 
they explore are how to prepare citizens so that they are ready to serve as 
jurors; how to ensure that citizens do not encounter barriers to serving as 
jurors; and how to help courts communicate more effectively with jurors 
during trial.  One of the contributors considers the limits of juries. Not all 
decisions are best handled by juries; sometimes other institutions are more 
appropriate decision-makers.  At the other end of the spectrum, a lawyer, law 
professor, and program manager, in a jointly authored contribution, recount 
their personal experiences in fighting against forced arbitration clauses and 
in support of the right to a jury trial. 
The contributors to this symposium take up questions about the jury that 
will be familiar to legal academics, lawyers, and judges, but some of the 
solutions the contributors offer will be novel to those immersed in the study 
or practice of law.  Although a few of the contributors acknowledge that their 
solutions might be overly optimistic or likely to run into resistance from law-
yers, nevertheless their suggestions are thought-provoking and will introduce 
readers to jury improvements that they might not have thought about before. 
This Introduction will proceed in two Parts.  In Part I, I provide a de-
scription of the symposium articles and the problems they focus on and the 
reforms they propose.  In Part II, I situate this symposium as part of an on-
going effort to build a community of interdisciplinary scholars, practitioners, 
and activists who are committed to the study and survival of the jury. 
1. Professor of Law and Director of the Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center, IIT Chicago-Kent College 
of Law.  I thank Mandy Lee, Research & Instructional Services Librarian at Chicago-Kent, for her re-
search assistance.  She always manages to find the needed information, even on very short notice. 
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I. IMPROVING THE JURY
Sonali Chakravarti brings the lens of a political scientist to her study of 
the jury.  In her article for this symposium, The Practice of Nullification, she 
views jury service as a practice for which citizens need a civic education that 
would begin in elementary school, continue throughout high school and col-
lege, and in community organizations after their formal schooling had ended.  
If citizens received this kind of education throughout their lives then when 
they are called to jury duty, they would already have a well-developed sense 
of what it means to be a thoughtful juror.  If citizens received this kind of 
education, then they would also have developed the criteria that would guide 
them as to when it is appropriate to engage in jury nullification, which is 
when the jury chooses not to follow the law.2  The criminal jury in particular 
has this power because it renders a general verdict and in cases of acquittal, 
the defendant cannot be tried again for the same crime by the same sover-
eign.3  Chakravarti wants citizens to develop a sense of when an acquittal in 
a criminal case is appropriate so that when they serve as jurors they will be 
willing to nullify if they think the case requires it. 
Chakravarti views jury service as a practice that needs to be developed 
over a lifetime so that when a citizen is called for jury duty that citizen un-
derstands his or her role.  If citizens had such an education, then they would 
know when it was appropriate to engage in nullification and when it was not.  
This understanding cannot be conveyed simply by a judge’s instruction to 
the jurors (assuming that judges could instruct on nullification, which they 
are not permitted to do in any federal circuit or in just about any state court).4
Rather, this understanding requires a lifelong education in civic responsibil-
ity, which is why Chakravarti views jury service as an ongoing practice and 
not simply as a short-lived duty. 
Chakravarti recognizes that the model of civic education that she envis-
ages might be overly optimistic at the moment, and that the next best solution 
might be to ensure that the court allows some cultural education about the 
history of the jury so that jurors learn about nullification from a variety of 
sources.  For example, she describes the trial of anti-war protestors, known 
as “the Camden 28,” who broke into a draft board to protest the Vietnam 
2. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 877, 881 (1999). 
3. See id. at 882. 
4. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury Nullification, 32 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 285, 310 n.116 (1995). 
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War.5 Chakravarti appreciated the broad scope the trial judge gave to the 
defense in permitting it to educate jurors about the role of the jury in Amer-
ican history.  Through the defense’s arguments and its witnesses, the jury 
received a mini-seminar on the jury.  Chakravarti notes, however, that even 
in this case the jury did not receive sufficient education on the erroneous uses 
of nullification or the standards that jurors should strive for when they serve 
as jurors.  Chakravarti wants to shift the debate about nullification from what 
jurors should be told about it in court through jury instructions to how they 
should learn about it as part of a larger, lifelong practice. 
In How To Talk So Juries Will Listen, Janet Randall, a linguist, offers 
ways to revise jury instructions so that jurors will be more likely to under-
stand them.  She is able to test her hypotheses as part of the Jury Instruction 
Project at the Linguistics & Law Lab at Northeastern University.  Through 
testing, she confirms hypotheses that many state courts have long acted upon, 
namely that jurors are more likely to understand jury instructions if they are 
written in plain language6 and if jurors are given an individual written copy 
of the instructions that they can follow as the judge reads the instructions 
aloud.7  Randall’s finding that jurors’ comprehension improves if they are 
asked questions during the reading of the instructions rather than at the end 
gives support to the idea that jurors should be able to ask questions at the end 
of the instructions, rather than waiting until they begin deliberations and have 
to send notes to the judge with their questions, which is the current practice. 
To conduct her testing, Randall, in conjunction with the Massachusetts 
Bar Association, rewrote several Massachusetts jury instructions in plain 
language.  As a linguist, she identified some of the problems with the current 
instructions, such as their reliance on specialized vocabulary, double nega-
tives, and complex nouns built from verbs (nominals).  Her plain language 
versions avoided these and other problems (such as the current instructions’ 
reliance on passive voice rather than active voice). 
She then tested her plain language versions as well as the current ver-
sions of the instructions with several groups of participants.  For one test, she 
used 214 undergraduates from Northeastern University.  She found that 
5. See, e.g., Donald Janson, 17 of Camden 28 Found Not Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1973, at A1 
(describing some of the highlights of the Camden 28 jury trial, the verdict the jury reached, and one of 
the judge’s instructions that “broke new legal ground”). 
6. See, e.g., James D. Wascher, The Long March Toward Plain English Jury Instructions, CBA REC., 
Feb.-Mar. 2005, at 50, 51 (describing state courts’ efforts to adopt pattern instructions with “‘a plain 
language emphasis’”). 
7. See, e.g., Jacqueline Connor, Jurors Need To Have Their Own Copies of Instructions, L.A. DAILY J., 
Feb. 25, 2004, at 7 (recommending to fellow judges that they give each juror a written copy of the in-
structions). 
576 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:3 
students who were given the plain language instructions with the written in-
structions had the best comprehension rate and those who heard only the 
current instructions had the lowest comprehension rate.  For a second test, 
she used 389 subjects from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) crowd-
sourcing platform.  She chose this second group because it is closer to a jury-
eligible population than the undergraduates from Northeastern. She observed 
a similar result.  Finally, in a third study, she tested whether undergraduates 
did better if they heard all the instructions and then answered questions about 
what they heard, or if they answered questions as they went along.  Randall 
found that they did better if they answered questions as they went along, so 
that they did not have to remember all of the instructions that they heard.  Of 
course, an actual jury needs to remember the instructions not just until the 
end of the instructions, but throughout its deliberations. 
Randall’s studies suggest that jury instructions would be better under-
stood by jurors if they were written in plain language and accompanied by a 
written copy of the instructions.  Her study suggests that jurors’ comprehen-
sion is best when they only have to hear the instructions in sections.  Inter-
esting next questions would be what happens if jurors have a chance to ask 
questions immediately after the instructions are read, and what happens 
when jurors are able to discuss the instructions during deliberations? Do 
these steps also improve jurors’ comprehension of the instructions? 
Ashley Rich, in her symposium contribution, Bye, Bye, Bilinguals: The 
Removal of English-Spanish Bilinguals from the Criminal Jury and Latino 
Discrimination, urges the U.S. Supreme Court to reexamine one of its earlier 
peremptory challenge cases, Hernandez v. New York.8  She criticizes this 
case because it continues to provide an excuse for prosecutors to use their 
peremptory challenges to remove Latino-American prospective jurors who 
speak English and Spanish. 
According to Rich, prosecutors do not always trust bilingual prospec-
tive jurors to accept a translator’s version of testimony.  They worry that 
bilingual jurors will follow their own understanding of what the witness or 
defendant says in Spanish.  Even if bilingual prospective jurors say that they 
will adhere to the translator’s version, prosecutors are not always persuaded 
that they will in fact do so; thus, they use their peremptory strikes to remove 
these prospective jurors.  When bilingual prospective jurors hesitate when 
asked whether they will rely wholly on the translator’s version of the testi-
mony, that gives prosecutors even more reason to remove them with a per-
emptory challenge.  Rich notes that prosecutors seem to focus on bilingual 
8.  500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
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Latino-American prospective jurors, but they do not seem to have the same 
concern about other bilingual prospective jurors, and they do not ask whether 
those prospective jurors without a Latino-American surname are in fact bi-
lingual. 
Rich laments the exclusion of Latino-American jurors because it de-
prives the jury of these jurors’ valuable perspectives during deliberations.  
She identifies this as a particularly pernicious problem in states, such as 
Texas, that have a large Mexican-American population.  She urges the Court 
to revisit the issue and to recognize that language is a key part of one’s iden-
tity and culture and that Latino-Americans should not be excluded as jurors 
because of their language.  She builds upon Hernandez v. Texas,9 in which 
the Court recognized that Mexican-Americans were a separate class from 
whites and that they were entitled to be tried by juries from which members 
of their class had not been systematically excluded based on their national 
origin.  She then argues that Latino-Americans continue to be excluded un-
der Hernandez v. New York.  She urges the Court to recognize that peremp-
tory challenges exercised in this manner are a violation of Batson v. Ken-
tucky10 and of a criminal defendant’s right to Equal Protection as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.11  There is a volu-
minous literature on Batson, much of it critical.12  Rich’s article adds another 
way in which peremptory challenges continue to be used to keep citizens 
from serving as jurors in spite of Batson’s promise and the guarantee of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  It remains all too easy for lawyers to exercise dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges and to explain them when challenged by 
giving a reason that is simply “a proxy for a discriminatory practice.”13
Michael Pressman, in The Relevance of Defendants’ Wealth for For-
ward-Looking, Backward-Looking, and Mixed Accounts of Tort Damages,
describes a proposal he made in an earlier article for how to determine dam-
ages in torts cases that result in death,14 and he considers in his symposium 
article whether his proposal could be applied to cases that do not involve 
death.  In doing so, his article points to the limits of juries and judges.  He 
9.  347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
10.  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
11.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
12.  See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REV.1137, 1141 n.9 (2017) (providing a sampling of recent academic articles 
critical of Batson). 
13.  See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 379 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
14.  See Michael Pressman, Hedonic-Loss Damages That Optimally Deter: An Alternative to “Value of 
a Statistical Life” That Focuses on Both Decedent and Tortfeasor, 72 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2021). 
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suggests that a state legislature might be the appropriate body to engage in 
such policy-making. 
Pressman’s proposal is that in torts cases that result in death, the optimal 
damages should be determined by examining the tortfeasor’s wealth (or tech-
nically, “utility curve”), rather than that of the plaintiff, even though this runs 
counter to what is typically done in tort law.  He wants to use the tortfeasor’s 
wealth because it would provide the most effective way of deterring a tort-
feasor from engaging in tortious behavior. 
In his article, Pressman explores whether his proposal to look at the 
tortfeasor’s wealth, rather than the plaintiff’s wealth, would also provide the 
optimal deterrence to the tortfeasor in non-death cases.  In other words, he 
wants to examine whether his proposal could be used in tort law in general, 
such as in cases involving economic damages and non-death, non-economic 
damages.  He concludes that it could be theoretically, but identifies a number 
of practical reasons why tort law uses the plaintiff’s wealth rather than the 
defendant’s wealth in these other non-death situations.  He explains that in 
focusing on deterrence, he has been taking a forward-looking approach to 
tort law, but tort law also takes a backward-looking approach by seeking to 
make the plaintiff whole again.  He thinks that there is a role for both ap-
proaches.  Pressman, in asking to what extent tort law should take a forward-
looking approach to damages in non-death cases ends up suggesting that this 
is a policy decision that might be most appropriate for state legislatures to 
make rather than juries or judges.  In doing so, he points to the limit of juries.  
He reminds us that there are a number of institutional decision-makers, and 
juries are not always the answer. 
Although juries might not always be the answer, the right to a jury trial 
needs to be protected so that those who are entitled to a jury trial can exercise 
their rights.  One threat to the right to a jury trial is the arbitration clause.  
Many businesses—whether they sell cell-phones or trade securities—include 
an arbitration clause in their standard contracts and if consumers want to 
purchase a product or service or if employees want to be hired then they must 
sign these contracts and accept the arbitration clause.  Under this clause, 
companies require that disputes be resolved by arbitration rather than by jury 
trial. 
Paul Bland, Myriam Gilles, and Tanuja Gupta recount their experiences 
in advocating against the forced arbitration clause in their symposium article 
From the Frontlines of the Modern Movement to End Forced Arbitration and 
Restore Jury Rights.  They each tell their story; thus, the subtitle of this piece 
is An Essay in Three Parts.
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Bland is a lawyer and Executive Director of Public Justice and has liti-
gated numerous cases in which his organization has challenged forced arbi-
tration clauses.  According to Bland, one of the most significant harms 
caused by the arbitration clause is that it stands in the way of individuals who 
would like to proceed as a class action.  For example, if a consumer has been 
cheated by a business, he or she can only proceed individually before an 
arbitrator, rather than proceeding as a class action with other consumers who 
have been similarly harmed.  An individual’s claim might be small, so few 
attorneys would be able to take the case, but if individuals could proceed as 
a class, then they could secure counsel and challenge the company’s practice.  
Bland litigated many cases challenging forced arbitration clauses and class 
action bans, but the Supreme Court’s cases, especially after AT & T Mobility 
v. Concepcion15 and American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restau-
rants16 expanded the class action bans.  Bland also hoped that the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau study would help focus national policy on the 
class action bans in arbitration clauses.  The study received significant media 
coverage and was an important resource for debate in the House of Repre-
sentatives, but unfortunately, a legislative solution was not forthcoming. 
Myriam Gilles, a law professor, contributes the next segment in this 
joint account, and focuses on legislative activity.  As an academic, she has 
researched and written about arbitration clauses.17  She has also followed 
legislative attempts to address the forced arbitration clause, as well as the 
Supreme Court’s protection of these arbitration clauses.  When the Senate 
Judiciary Committee scheduled hearings on the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2013, Gilles was invited to testify.  She left the hearings feeling optimistic 
that there might be federal legislation, but in the end, the bill died.  Even 
when President Obama came into office and signed an Executive Order that 
barred federal agencies from entering into agreements with companies that 
force their workers to arbitrate claims for sexual assault, harassment, or dis-
crimination, President Trump later repealed it.  Gilles maintains her opti-
mism that there will eventually be a law against forced arbitration clauses. 
Tanuja Gupta, a Program Manager at Google and an organizer of the 
Google Walkout, describes how she became an activist and worked to 
change Google’s practice of including arbitration clauses in its employment 
contracts.  She ran the Google Walkout for New York, and afterward, she 
15.  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
16.  570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
17.  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 371; Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005) (describing forced arbitration). 
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continued to work with several fellow employees to lobby Congress for leg-
islation that would eliminate the arbitration clauses at companies such as 
Google.  She learned how to educate fellow workers, build coalitions with 
lawyers and other advocates, and lobby Congress for legislation.  The most 
moving part for her was hearing other workers’ experiences with these arbi-
tration clauses.  Although Google finally eliminated the forced arbitration 
clause for its employees (current and future) on all issues, the fight continues 
at other companies. 
The joint symposium contribution by Bland, Gilles, and Gupta suggests 
that collaboration by people from different walks of life is necessary to pro-
tect institutions such as the jury.  Bland, Gilles, and Gupta view the forced 
arbitration clause as a threat to the jury.  The right to a trial by jury, enshrined 
in the U.S. Constitution, is “fundamental to the American scheme of jus-
tice.”18 As the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in Duncan v. Louisiana, trial by 
jury is “an inestimable safeguard” designed to protect us from the “corrupt 
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge.”19
II. FOSTERING A COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS, PRACTITIONERS, AND 
ACTIVISTS COMMITTED TO THE JURY
This symposium, like the collaboration by Bland, Gilles, and Gupta, 
reminds us of the need to create communities that bring together individuals 
from different disciplines and practices to exchange ideas, to learn from each 
other, and to recommit to fundamental institutions such as the jury.  These 
communities can take different forms. 
One form of community is the creation of jury centers.  At Chicago-
Kent College of Law, I have created the Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Cen-
ter.  This jury center was named in honor, and now in memory, of U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, a defender of the jury, and for whom 
I had the great privilege to clerk for two years.  At New York University 
School of Law, Stephen Susman created the Civil Jury Project, where Anna 
Offit and Michael Pressman served as Research Fellows.  These centers take 
on a range of projects, with the Civil Jury Project working primarily with 
judges and lawyers and the Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center focusing 
largely on academics, but both are committed to the jury and to educating 
the public, media, and law students about this vital institution.  Stephen Sus-
man, whom we recently lost to the pandemic, was fiercely dedicated to the 
18.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
19.  Id. at 156. 
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jury.  As a litigator, he saw the vital role that the jury plays in providing 
recompense for those who had been harmed and who had no other recourse 
but to proceed in court.  Susman understood that the American jury could be 
lost if ordinary people did not know about its function or care about preserv-
ing it.  Perhaps that is why Anna Offit chose Reviving the American Jury as 
the title for this symposium.  With the number of jury trials ever dwindling,20
there is a great need to understand threats to the jury, to explore ways to 
reform the institution so that it will survive, and to teach today’s schoolchil-
dren about the jury so that they will join the ranks of those who value it and 
protect it. 
Another form of community is the creation of written symposia on the 
jury.  The Chicago-Kent Law Review, with its unique symposium format, 
has enabled jury symposia to thrive.  In the past two decades, I have worked 
hard to make the Chicago-Kent Law Review one of the foremost sources of 
symposia on the jury.  The Chicago-Kent Law Review has published four 
jury symposia, including: Juries and Lay Participation: American Perspec-
tives and Global Trends, Comparative Jury Systems, The 50th Anniversary of 
12 Angry Men, The American Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experi-
ence, as well as one related symposia on Secrecy in Litigation.21  This sym-
posium, Reviving the American Jury, organized by Anna Offit, will bring the 
number to six.  This symposium joins an ongoing, long-term project to create 
a home for jury scholarship. 
Yet another form of community is the in-person gathering that jury con-
ferences provide.  There is something very special about the kind of ex-
change and engagement that conferences foster.  They enable participants to 
share ideas during formal presentations, but also during casual conversations 
over coffee or while walking to the next panel.  Chicago-Kent Law Review
has encouraged this kind of face-to-face exchange by helping to organize 
conferences at Chicago-Kent.  Several years ago, the Chicago-Kent Law Re-
view assisted with an on-site conference on Juries and Lay Participation: 
American Perspectives and Global Trends.22
20.  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
21.  See Symposium, Juries and Lay Participation: American Perspectives and Global Trends, 90 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 785 (2015); Symposium, Comparative Jury Systems, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 449 (2011); 
Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of 12 Angry Men, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 551 (2007); Symposium, 
The Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907 (2003); see also Sympo-
sium, Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2006). 
22.  This on-site conference took place at Chicago-Kent College of Law on October 10, 2014.  Valerie P. 
Hans and I served as co-symposium organizers and editors. 
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Organizations such as the Law & Society Association (LSA) have cre-
ated an international community of interdisciplinary scholars, with a thriving 
culture of Collaborative Research Networks (CRNs), including one on Lay 
Participation in Legal Systems.  This CRN, founded by Sanja Kutnjak 
,YNRYLü9DOHULH3+DQVDQG0DU\55RVHKDs brought together scholars 
from various disciplines who share a passionate interest in lay participation.  
This CRN organizes jury panels at every LSA annual meeting, and has been 
the catalyst for collaborations among its members on a variety of projects, 
including books,23 international jury conferences,24 and symposia.25 Because 
this CRN draws its participants from around the world, there is an oppor-
tunity for American jury scholars to learn about juries and other forms of lay 
participation worldwide. 
Both written symposia and face-to-face conferences allow academics 
and practitioners to learn from those in our own disciplines or practices, as 
well as from those in other disciplines and practices.  This symposium, Re-
viving the American Jury, follows that tradition.  Anna Offit has brought to-
gether academics from law, linguistics, and government, as well as practi-
tioners from law and technology.  Past Chicago-Kent Law Review symposia 
on the jury have included academics from sociology, psychology, political 
science, criminal justice, jurisprudence, film studies, and law and popular 
culture, as well as clinicians, prosecutors, judges, law clerks, and former ju-
rors. 
All of these collaborative endeavors, including jury centers, symposia, 
conferences, and research networks, depend upon new voices and new mem-
bers.  Anna Offit is one such member, and by organizing this symposium she 
has introduced other new voices to this community.  My hope is that other 
jury scholars, who are relatively new to the profession, will follow Anna’s 
lead, and organize future jury symposia in the Chicago-Kent Law Review.
We welcome new scholars, practitioners, and activists so that this commu-
nity will be ongoing and will continue its efforts to study, improve, and safe-
guard the jury for future generations. 
23.  See JURIES, LAY JUDGES, AND MIXED COURTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 6DQMD.XWQMDN,YNRYLü
Valerie P. Hans, Shari Seidman Diamond & Nancy S. Marder eds., 2020). 
24.  See, e.g., Juries and Mixed Tribunals across the Globe: New Developments, Common Challenges 
and Future Directions, Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati, Spain, June 2014.  
The organizing committee for this conference consisted of Nancy S. Marder (Chicago-Kent College of 
Law), Valerie P. Hans (Cornell Law School), Mar Jimeno-Bulnes (University of Burgos, Spain), and 
Stephen C. Thaman (Saint Louis University School of Law). 
25.  See, e.g., Symposium, Juries and Mixed Tribunals across the Globe: New Developments, Common 
Challenges and Future Directions, 6 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 163 (2016). 
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CONCLUSION
This symposium’s title, Reviving the American Jury, suggests that the 
jury is in need of immediate attention, and it is.  Thus, this symposium arrives 
at a propitious moment.  The contributors to this symposium offer their ideas 
about ways to renew and reform the jury.  In doing so, they join a dedicated 
community of scholars, practitioners, and activists who are committed to en-
suring that the American jury will thrive and endure.  
